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The attempt by the Autonomous Community of Catalonia (hereinafter «Catalonia») to break away from 
Spain raises several interesting questions that go to the heart of international law, namely statehood, self- 
determination, territorial integrity, and recognition. This article demonstrates that Catalonia has no entitle-
ment under international law to obtain independence. It has nonetheless the right to pursue its economic, 
social, and cultural policies, even beyond its borders and those of Spain, provided that the Spanish Constitu-
tion and the Statute of Autonomy are respected. 
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The question of the claim to independence put forward by the Autonomous Commu-
nity of Catalonia (hereinafter «Catalonia») has dominated the political agenda in 
Spain for several years and no definitive solution is in sight yet. This article provides 
a concise overview of the events related to the Catalan independence bid, which cul-
minated to the 2017 illegal referendum, and the position taken by the Constitutional 
Tribunal. It then analyses the relevant international legal issues with a view to de-
fining Catalonia’s entitlements under international law and to assess its claim from 
the standpoint of the key concepts and principles, most prominently statehood, self- 
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determination, secession and recognition. Understanding and respecting those con-
cepts and principles is indispensable to reach a satisfactory solution in the present 
crisis. 
II. Overview of the Facts
The Constitution of Spain, promulgated in 1978, provides that «[n]ational sover-
eignty is vested in the Spanish people, from whom emanate the powers of the State» 
(Article 1.2). It also solemnly proclaims «the indissoluble unity of the Spanish na-
tion, the common and indivisible country of all Spaniards», and guarantees «the 
right to autonomy of the nationalities and regions of which it is composed, and the 
solidarity amongst them all» (Article 2). Accordingly, Articles 148 and 149 define, 
respectively, the exclusive competences of the State and those of Autonomous 
 Communities.1
The relationship between the central government and Catalonia are currently 
governed by the 2006 Statute of Autonomy according to which Catalonia’s self- 
government is founded on the Constitution and the historical rights of the Catalan 
people. The Statute also protects the wish of Catalonia «to develop its political per-
sonality within the framework of a State, which recognises and respects the diversity 
of identities of the peoples of Spain».2
On 28 June 2010, the Constitutional Tribunal declared unconstitutional several 
provisions of the Statute.3 It firmly held that the autonomy of Catalonia is based on 
and must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution. It also emphasised that 
the Statute is subordinated to the Constitution while its provisions are not expression 
of a sovereign power, but merely of a devolved autonomy. According to the Tribunal, 
the «Spanish people» are the sole holder of national sovereignty, whereas the «peo-
ple of Catalonia» are the holder of public powers to be exercised in conformity with 
the Constitution and the Statute of autonomy. The decision was criticised by the in-
dependentist minority of the Catalonian Parliament for watering down the Statute.
In 2012, the Catalan authorities claimed the «right to decide» and announced 
Catalonia as «a new State of Europe», based on the imprescriptible and inalienable 
right to self-determination as democratic expression of its sovereignty as nation.4 The 
claim was further articulated in a document according to which the process towards 
1 Spanish Constitution, unofficial English translation available at <http://www.senado.es/web/conocer 
senado/normas/constitucion/index.html?lang=es_ES>. All websites last visited on 31 October 2020. The 
decisions rendered by the Constitutional Tribunal referred to in the article are available, in the English 
translation, at <https://www.tribunalconstitucional.es>.
2 Organic Act 6/2006, 19 July 2006, on the Reform of the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, at <https://
www.parlament.cat/document/cataleg/150259.pdf>.
3 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment 31/2010, 28 June 2010, BOE-A-2010-11409.
4 Resolution 742/IX, 27 September 2012, at <https://www.parlament.cat/document/intrade/6026>. 
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independence was based on «three main principles»: (a) self-determination in ap-
plication of a democratic principle; (b) self-determination as an inalienable right of a 
national community; and (c) self-determination as the last resort to remedy an unjust 
situation.5 
These were amongst the first of a long sequence of legal and political documents, 
most of them dismissed by the legal advisors of the Catalan Government, aimed at 
achieving Catalonia independence. All of them were systematically declared uncon-
stitutional by the Tribunal Constitutional to the extent they challenged the unity of 
Spain and prospected the «sovereignty» of Catalonia.6 For the Tribunal, «only the 
Spanish People are sovereign, exclusively and indivisibly, no other subject or State 
body or any part of the people can be endowed with sovereign status by a public 
power». The Tribunal also held that the «right to decide» cannot be considered 
unconstitutional if it is interpreted not as «a manifestation of a right of self-determi-
nation, or as an unrecognized attribution of sovereignty», but rather as a political 
aspiration in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of democratic le-
gitimacy, pluralism and legality.7 
In a subsequent decision, the Tribunal emphasised that Spain is a composite 
State, while its territorial entities enjoy political autonomy but are not subjects of 
international law and therefore cannot participate in international relations. Being 
the only subject of international law, the central government has exclusive compe-
tence it the field of international relations, as clearly provided for in Article 149.1.3 of 
the Constitution and reflected in the principle of unity of action abroad, which is 
enshrined in Law 2/2014 on External Relations.8 The Tribunal further clarified that 
the exclusive competence of the central government refers to the relations between 
international subjects and most prominently the conclusion of treaties (ius contra-
hendi), the external representation of the State (ius legationis), as well as to the crea-
tion of international obligations and the international responsibility of the State. Yet, 
the Tribunal recognized the right of an Autonomous Communities to project them-
selves outside their territories and even abroad, provided that these activities are nec-
5 White Paper on the National Transition of Catalonia. Synthesis (2014), at <http://economia.gencat.cat/
web/. content/70_economia_catalana/Subinici/Llistes/nou-estat/catalonia-new-state-europe/national- 
transition-catalonia.pdf>.
6 These decisions include Judgment 42/2014, 25 March 2014, BOE-A-2014-3885 , Ground 3; Judgment 
31/2015, 25  February 2015, BOE-A-2015-2832; Judgment 32/2015, 25  February 2015, BOE-A-2015-
2833; Judgment 46/2015, 5 March 2015, BOE-A-2015-3824, Ground 4; Judgment 259/2015, 2 Decem-
ber 2015, BOE-A-2016-308; Judgment 170/2016, 6  October 2016, BOE-A-2016-10671; Judgment 
215/2016, 15 December 2016, BOE-A-2017-650; Judgment 114/2017, 17 October 2017, BOE-A-2017-
13230; Judgment 124/2017, 8 November 2017, BOE-A-2017-13228.
7 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment 42/2014, 25 March 2014, Ground 3; Judgment 46/2015, 5 March 
2015.
8 BOE-A-2014-3248, available at <https://www.boe.es/eli/es/l/2014/03/25/2/con>.
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essary or convenient for the exercise of their own powers and do not invade the exclu-
sive competence of the State in matters of international relations.9
Notwithstanding the decisions by the Constitutional Tribunal, the Catalan au-
thorities pursued their independence claim and organised non-binding consulta-
tions, which took place on 9 November 2014. The referendum was eventually found 
unconstitutional10 and the President and some members of the Catalan Government 
responsible of grave contempt to the Constitutional Tribunal and banned from office 
by Catalan High Court of Justice and Supreme Court.
The saga continued nonetheless with the announcement of «the start of the pro-
cess to create an independent Catalan State in the form of a republic», the «dis-
connection» with the law of the Spain and a «unilateral mechanism of democratic 
exercise» meant to activate the convening of the Constituent Assembly. A further 
resolution defined the general political orientation of the Government of Catalonia.11
In turn, the Spanish parliament adopted Law 15/2015 aimed at the effective en-
forcement of the judgments of the Constitutional Tribunal.12 The law was considered 
constitutional in two appeals made by Catalonia13 and the Basque region.14 The Tri-
bunal pointed out that the measures aimed at enforcing its decisions not only 
 concerning the Autonomous Communities, but also those concerning the central 
authorities.
In 2017, the Catalan Parliament organised a referendum on self-determination, 
with no legal basis. Article 2 of Law 19/2017 proclaimed «[t]he people of Catalonia 
are a sovereign political subject and, as such, exercise its right to freely and democrati-
cally decide upon their political condition».15 Law 20/2017, in turn, was adopted in 
order to allow Catalonia «to function immediately and with maximum effective-
ness» in the transitional period between the referendum on self-determination and 
the adoption of the Constitution by the Constituent Assembly.16 
Although the Constitutional Tribunal suspended both pieces of legislation, on 
12 September 2017, the Catalan Parliament went ahead with the referendum, which 
occurred amid clashes between certain segments of the local population and the po-
9 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment 28/2016, 22 December 2016.
10 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment 31/2015, 25 February 2015; Judgment 32/2015, 25 February 2015.
11 See Resolution 1/XI, 9  November 2015, <https://www.parlament.cat/document/intrade/153127>; 
Reso lution 263/XI, 27 July 2016, <https://www.parlament.cat/document/intrade/175266>; and Reso-
lution 306/XI, 6 October 2016, Resolution 263/XI, 27 July 2016, <https://www.parlament.cat/docu 
ment/bopc/182074.pdf>.
12 Adopted on 16 October 2015, BOE-A-2015-11160, <https://www.boe.es/eli/es/lo/2015/10/16/15>.
13 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment 215/2016, 15 December 2016.
14 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment 185/2016, 3 November 2016.
15 Law 19/2017, at <http://exteriors.gencat.cat/web/.content/00_ACTUALITAT/notes_context/Law-
19_2017-on-the-Referendum-on-Self-determination.pdf>.
16 Law 20/2017 Juridical transition and founding of the Republic, at <http://exteriors.gencat.cat/web/ 
.content/00_ACTUALITAT/notes_context/Law-20_2017-on-Juridical-Transition.pdf>.
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lice. On 10 October, the President of Catalonia assumed «the mandate of the people 
whereby Catalonia becomes an independent State», but proposed the Catalan Par-
liament to suspend the effects of the referendum and to engage in dialogue with the 
central government. The same day, the MPs of the pro-independence bloc, who de-
fined themselves as the «legitimate representatives of Catalonia», although they rep-
resented less than half of the population, issued a declaration of independence with 
no legal basis17 proclaimed in a non-regular meeting outside the main room of the 
parliament.
The Constitutional Tribunal unanimously declared null and unconstitutional 
both the Law on the Referendum,18 and the Law of Juridical Transition.19 It held 
unambiguously that the Constitution obviously does not recognize any right to uni-
lateral secession. Quite the contrary, the law on referendum was deemed inconsistent 
with several articles of the Constitution, including Articles 1.2 and 2 dealing, respec-
tively, with national sovereignty being vested in the Spanish people, the indissoluble 
unity of the Spanish Nation, and the guarantee of the right to autonomy of the na-
tionalities and regions composing Spain.
On 17 October, the central government for the first time triggered the applica-
tion of Article 155 Constitution, which led to the adoption of a series of firm meas-
ures, including the dismissal of the President and the Catalonia Government. His 
functions were now assumed by central authorities.20 On 27 October, the President 
and some members of the Catalan Government fled to Belgium, while the Vice-Presi-
dent and other members were arrested and charged with several criminal offences. 
The later were eventually found guilty by the Supreme Court of sedition and misuse 
of public funds.21
17 At <http://www.cataloniavotes.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/27-Declaration-of-Independence.pdf>.
18 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment 114/2017, 17 October 2017, at <https://www.tribunalconstitucional.
es/ResolucionesTraducidas/Ley%20referendum%20ENGLISH.pdf>. See also Asier Garrido- Muñoz, 
«Prime Minister v. Parliament of Catalonia», 112 American J. Int’l L. (2018), 80–88.
19 Constitutional Tribunal, Judgment 124/2017, 8 November 2017, at <https://www.tribunalconstitu cio 
nal.es/ResolucionesTraducidas/Ley%20transitoriedad%20ENGLISH.pdf>.
20 Order PRA/1034/2017 Section A. For a detailed treatment of the application of Article 155, see María 
Jesús García Morales, «Federal Execution, Article 155 of the Spanish Constitution and the Crisis 
in Catalonia», 73 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (2018), 791–830; Manuel Cavero Gómez, «La 
aplicación del artículo 155 de la Constitución a la comunidad autónoma de Cataluña. Comentario a las 
Sentencias del Tribunal Constitucional 89/2019, de 2 de julio, y 90/2019, de 2 de julio», 107 Revista de 
las Cortes Generales (2019), 507–519; L. Payero-López, «Assessing the Spanish State’s Response to 
Catalan Independence: The Application of Federal Coercion», in: A-G. Gagnon & A. Tremblay (eds.), 
Federalism and National Diversity in the 21st Century, Cham 2020, 73–104.
21 Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, Judgment No. 459/2019, 14 October 2019, <http://www.poderju 
dicial.es/cgpj/es/Poder-Judicial/Noticias-Judiciales/El-Tribunal-Supremo-condena-a-nueve-de-los-pro 
cesados-en-la-causa-especial-20907-2017-por-delito-de-sedicion>, English translation available. In lit-
erature see, amongst many, A. Bar Cendón, «El proceso independentista de Cataluña y la doctrina 
jurisprudencial: una visión sistemática», 37 Teoria y Realidad Constitucional (2016), 187–220; J.M. 
Castellà Andreu, «Tribunal Constitucional y proceso secesionista catalán: respuestas jurídico-con-
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Spanish authorities also issued an arrest warrant and requested the extradition of 
Mr Puigdemont and other former members of the Catalan government.22 The case 
got even more complicated as some of the independent leaders were elected to the 
European Parliament. The case of Mr. Junqueras, who has been detained since, has 
triggered a series of decisions before the Supreme Court as well as a preliminary rul-
ing of the European Court of Justice.23 Meanwhile, the Spanish Parliament had re-
quested the European Parliament to waive the immunities of its members involved in 
the Catalan independence bid. Although related to the independence attempt, these 
developments fall beyond the scope of this article. 
The Catalan declaration of independence met the firm dismissal of the European 
Union24 and its members, as well as virtually all States.25 The President of the Euro-
pean Parliament, in particular, defined it as «a breach of the rule of law, the Spanish 
Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy of Catalonia, which are part of the Euro-
pean Union’s legal framework».26 
III. Legal Analysis
From the standpoint of international law, the Catalonian independence question 
raises a series of issues related to key concepts of international law, namely: (1) terri-
torial integrity; (2) self-determination; (3) declarations of independence; (4) seces-
sion; and (5) recognition. A concise analysis of these concepts and their impact in the 
present case shall now be offered. 
stitucionales a un conflicto político-constitucional», 37 Teoria y Realidad Constitucional (2016), 561–
592; J. De Miguel Bárcena, «El proceso soberanista ante el Tribunal Constitucional», 113 Revista 
española de derecho constitucional (2018), 133–166 .
22 For an early reflexion, see Stefan Braum, «The Carles Puigdemont Case: Europe’s Criminal Law in 
the Crisis of Confidence», 19 German Law Review (2018), 1349–1358. 
23 Judgment of the Court (Grand Chamber), C-502/19, EU:C:2019:1115, Junqueras Vies. On 9 January 
2020, the Supreme Court, Criminal Chamber, Special Proceedings 20907/2017, found that there were 
no grounds to authorise Mr Junqueras to travel to the seat of the European Parliament, to order his 
 release, or to set aside the judgment issued on 14 October 2019.
24 See Richard Caplan & Zachary Vermeer, «The European Union and Unilateral Secession: The 
Case of Catalonia», 73 Zeitschrift für öffentliches Recht (2018), 767–789. 
25 See, for example: State Department, Press Statement, 27 October 2017, at <https://www.state.gov/on-u-s- 
support-for-spanish-unity>, according to which «Catalonia is an integral part of Spain, and the United 
States supports the Spanish government’s constitutional measures to keep Spain strong and united»; 
United Kingdom, Statement on UDI made by Catalan regional parliament: 27 October 2017, at <https://
www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-on-udi-made-by-catalan-regional-parliament-27-october- 
2017>; Argentina, Situation in Catalonia, 27 October 2017, Press Release 482/17, <https://cancilleria.
gob.ar/en/news/releases/argenti na-and-situation-catalonia>.
26 European Parliament President statement on the situation in Catalonia, 27 October 2017.
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A. Territorial Integrity
In the modern international legal order, the principle of territoriality and the sur-
rounding legal consequences are the core elements of personal, spatial and conceptual 
ordering. The treaties of Westphalia (1648) can be considered as the culmination of 
an incremental process leading to the creation of sovereign states entitled to freely 
organise themselves (internal dimension) without any interference from outside (ex-
ternal dimension).27 The UN General Assembly proclaimed that «any attempt 
aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity 
of a State or country or at its political independence is incompatible with the pur-
poses and principles of the Charter»28 and «[t]he territorial integrity and political 
independence of the State are inviolable».29 In the Millennium Declaration, UN 
member States formally declare: «we rededicate ourselves to support all efforts to 
uphold the sovereign equality of all States, respect for their territorial integrity and 
political independence, […] the right to self-determination of peoples which remain 
under colonial domination and foreign occupation, non-interference in the internal 
affairs of States».30 The International Court of Justice held that respect for territorial 
integrity between independent States «is an essential foundation of international 
relations»,31 or «an important part of the international legal order», enshrined inter 
alia in the Charter of the United Nations and in particular in Article 2, paragraph 
4.32 Importantly for the purpose of this inquiry, it also held that «the principle of 
territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States».33 A non-
State entity or an armed group is not bound under general international law to re-
spect this rule. If it were otherwise, any attempt at secession would be contrary to 
international law. Even the altering of the constitutional asset relating to territory 
(e.g. concerning local autonomies) could be considered to be an attack on the territo-
27 Richard A. Falk, «The Interplay of Westphalia and Charter Conceptions of the International Legal 
Order», in: Richard A. Falk & Cyril E. Black (eds.), The Future of the International Legal Order, vol.1, 
New Jersey 1969, 32–70, 43–44. 
28 GA Res. 1514, 14 December 1960, para 6. The principle was clearly reiterated in GA Res. 71/292, 22 June 
2017 (Request for Chagos Archipelago advisory opinion).
29 GA Res. 2625 (XXV), 24 October 1970, Annex, Declaration on Principles of International Law concern-
ing Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the UN Charter. 
30 GA RES. 55/2, 8 September 2000, para 4. See also GA RES. 60/1 (World Summit Outcome), 24 October 
2005, para 5. 
31 Corfu Channel Case, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 35.
32 Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 403, para 80.
33 Ibidem. See also (cf. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia 
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. 
Reports 1971, pp. 31–32, paras. 52–53; East Timor (Portugal v. Australia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, 
p. 102, para. 29; Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, 136, para. 88.
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rial unity of the State and be proscribed. International practice shows that such ex-
treme limitations on insurrection cannot be inferred from international law as it 
stands. 
In the case of Catalonia, the territorial integrity principle means first of all that 
third States cannot intervene in the internal affairs of Spain by sustaining the seces-
sionist process, since they would then be contributing to disrupt the principle of 
Spanish territorial integrity. The principle here conflates largely to the other one re-
lated to the non-intervention in internal affairs. Thus, the extreme restraint displayed 
by the EU in this context lives up to the principle of territorial unity and non-in-
tervention. Second, the principle further implies that any use of force by third States 
in this context is all the more excluded, since such a course would violate at once 
the principle of territorial integrity, of non-intervention and of non-use of force. 
Third, although the principle does not bind Catalonia as a matter of international 
law, Spanish Constitution provides autonomously for the protection of Spain terri-
torial integrity. 
The concrete result is that the territorial integrity unit rests the one of Spain. In 
the absence of any governmental effectiveness of the purported secessionist entity, 
there is no new State and thus no new territorial setting. The territorial unity of Spain 
is consequently protected under international law against third States and under 
 constitutional law against internal actors. 
B. Self-Determination 
The law on self-determination (hereafter SD) has many facts, is legally complex and 
in particular has a much less sweeping scope under international law than generally 
assumed in common parlance. This comes as no surprise: international law is made 
by States, and most States are reluctant to concede a broad right of SD and to possibly 
become entangled themselves into claims for secession and independence. Over time, 
a fundamental distinction has emerged between external SD (right to secession) and 
internal SD (human rights guarantees, minority rights). While the first type of SD is 
granted only in exceptional circumstances, the second is allowed on a much broader 
basis under the human rights pull of our days. There is thus a huge difference in the 
material and personal scope of application between external SD and internal SD. 
1. External self-determination
The relevant UNGA resolutions on external SD reflect this state of affairs. Firstly, the 
right of peoples to self-determination was tightly linked with the process of decolo-
nization, and in particular situations of peoples under colonial or other forms of alien 
domination or foreign occupation. Resolution 1514 (XV), in particular, expressly 
proclaimed «the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism 
31 SRIEL (2021) 9
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in all its forms and manifestations».34 The limited application of the right was con-
sistently upheld by the ICJ in a series of decisions and advisory opinions. In the Na-
mibia advisory opinion, in particular, the ICJ declared the right to self-determina-
tion contained in the UN Charter applicable to all non-self-governing territories 
referred to in Chapter XI of the Charter.35 In the Kosovo advisory opinion, it empha-
sized that «[d]uring the second half of the twentieth century, the international law 
of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for 
the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, 
domination and exploitation».36 It follows, a contrario, that minorities or ethnic 
groups do not enjoy these types of rights, culminating in separation or secession. 
Secondly, the creation of an independent State through the detachment from the 
parent State was not the only option for the exercise of the right to self-determina-
tion, even if it became by far the most popular one.37 Resolution 1541 specified three 
modalities for the exercise of self-determination by Non Self-Governing Territories, 
namely: (a) emergence of a sovereign independent State; (b) free association with an 
independent State: or (c) integration with an independent State.38 Resolution 2625, 
further introduced «any other political status freely determined by the concerned 
people». Self-determination should therefore not be equated to secession. Further-
more, since the Non Self-Governing Territories enjoyed a temporary special status 
(until the right to self-determination has been fully exercised), it is not accurate to 
describe the formation of independent States as instances of secession.
Thirdly, the applicable law is fully respectful of the principle of territorial integ-
rity. It cannot be construed as to authorizing or encouraging «any action that would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of 
sovereign and independent States».39 Quite the contrary, «[a]ny attempt at the par-
tial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country 
is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Na-
tions»,40 or, as recently maintained by the African Union, the right to self-determi-
34 See also Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, p. 12, para 55.
35 Namibia Case, supra n. 33, p. 31. Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from 
Mauritius in 1965, Advisory Opinion, 25 February 2019, esp. para 87.
36 Kosovo Unilateral Declaration, advisory opinion, supra n. 32, para 79. In Judgment of the Court (Grand 
Chamber), C-104/16, EU:C:2016:973, Council v. Front Polisario, para 88, held that the principle of 
self-determination is «applicable to all non-self-governing territories and to all peoples who have not 
achieved independence yet». 
37 Theodore Christakis, Le droit à l’auto-détermination en dehors des situations de décolonisation, 
1999.
38 GA Res 1541 (XV), 15 December 1960, Principle VI.
39 GA Res. 2625 (XXV). See also GA Res. 1573 (XV), 19 December 1960 and Res. 1274 (XVI), 20 Decem-
ber 1961 (Algeria) as well as Res. 2066 (XX), 16 December 1965, and Res. A/RES/2357, 19 December 
1967, (Mauritius).
40 GA A/RES/50/6, 24 October 1995.
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nation was intrinsically linked to the principle of territorial integrity.41 In the Chagos 
Archipelago advisory opinion, the ICJ unambiguously held that «the peoples of 
non-self-governing territories are entitled to exercise their right to self-determination 
in relation to their territory as a whole, the integrity of which must be respected by 
the administering Power».42 
2. Internal self-determination
Internal SD developed more slowly: it was first occulted by the more topical and ur-
gent situation relating to anti-colonial struggle. The UN Charter as well as several 
universal and regional human rights treaties, including the UN Covenants on Civil 
and Political Rights and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,43 and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights,44 provide for the application of the right to 
self-determination to all peoples.45 This right has systematically been accompanied, 
however, by reassurances that its exercise must be respectful of the territorial integ-
rity of States. All peoples were thus entitled to claim and enjoy the right of peoples to 
self-determination within the jurisdiction of their own State. Conversely, the right of 
peoples to self-determination could not be invoked to unilaterally alter international 
borders. Thus, the General Comment 12 by the Human Rights Committee46 and, in 
even more eloquent terms, the General Recommendation by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination,47 have reiterated that the right of self-determi-
nation has an internal dimension, granting to all peoples the right to pursue freely 
their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference, as well 
41 Written Statement, 15 May 2018, Chagos Archipelago, Advisory opinion, supra n. 35, para 181. See also 
the previous Written Statement, 1 March 2018, esp. paras 143–157. 
42 Chagos Archipelago, Advisory opinion, supra note n. 35, para 160.
43 GA Res. 2200A (XXI), 16  December 1966, entered into force, respectively on 23  March 1976, 999 
UNTS 171, and 3 January 1976, 993 UNTS 3. Common Article 1.1 reads: «All peoples have the right of 
self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue 
their economic, social and cultural development». 
44 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 
1986, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982), Article 20. 
45 See, in particular, Michael Pomerance, «The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives 
on the Wilsonian Conception», 70 American J. Int’l L. (1976), 1–27; R. McCorquodale, «Self-De-
termination: A Human Rights Approach», 43 Int’l and Comparative L. Quarterly (1994), 857–885; 
M. Saul, «The Normative Status of Self-Determination in International Law: A Formula for Uncer-
tainty in the Scope and Content of the Right?», 11 Human Rights L. R. (2011), 609–644 . 
46 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 12 (1984), HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I). According 
to para 4, the realization of the right to self-determination «is an essential condition for the effective 
guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those 
rights» (emphasis added).
47 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation 21, The Right to 
Self-Determination (1996), U.N. Doc. HRI\GEN\1\Rev.6 at 209 (2003), para 4. See also In Reference Re 
Secession of Quebec [1998] 2 R.C.S., para 126. 
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as an external dimension, granting to all peoples in situations of colonialism, alien 
subjugation, domination, and exploitation the right to determine freely their politi-
cal status. The jurisprudence and opinions on this internal SD make it abundantly 
clear that such internal SD does not allow the altering of international boundaries 
and secession. The practice and jurisprudence of the African Commission, for exam-
ple, amply confirmed that Article 20 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights does not imply any departure from the traditional approach to self-determi-
nation, which permits secession only in the colonial context.48 In Congrès du people 
katangais v Democratic Republic of Congo, in particular, the Commission held that 
self-determination means «independence, self-government, local government, feder-
alism, confederalism, unitarism or any other form of relations that accords with the 
wishes of the peoples but fully cognisant of other recognised principles such as so-
vereignty and territorial integrity».49 In a more recent case, while finding that the 
people of Southern Cameroon can legitimately claim to be a «people» for the pur-
pose of Article 20, the Commission felt «obliged to uphold the territorial integrity 
of the Respondent State» and could not «envisage, condone or encourage secession, 
as a form of self-determination».50
Outside the colonial context, the right to self-determination suffers from two 
serious congenital deficiencies, namely the lack of any definition of «people»,51 and 
consequently the lack of criteria to identify who is entitled to represent and speak on 
behalf of a «people». As pointed out by the Canadian Supreme Court, there is «lit-
tle formal elaboration of the definition of ’peoples’ which left the precise meaning of 
the term» open.52 A Group of Experts appointed by UNESCO has attempted to 
identify some characteristics inherent in a description (not a definition) of «people». 
They include: (a) a common historical tradition; (b) racial or ethnic identity; (c) cul-
tural homogeneity; (d) linguistic unity; (e) religious or ideological affinity; (f) terri-
torial connection; and (g) common economic life.53 This opens the way for minorities 
and indigenous peoples. To the extent that the right does not encompass the sharp 
edge of secession, but only the grant of human and minority rights, the lack of a more 
elaborated definition is not of great harm. Indeed, it is generally accepted that the 
48 African Commission, Guidelines and Principles on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2010) para 41. See also Resolution on the situation of the North 
of the Republic of Mali, ACHPR/Res.217(LI)2012, 2 May 2012, points iv and ix.
49 Communication 75/92, 22 March 1995, para 5.
50 Kevin Mgwanga Gunme et al. v. Cameroon, Case 266/03, 27 May 2009, at <https://www.achpr.org/ses 
sions/descions?id=189>, para 190.
51 Writing in 1956, Ian Jennings, The Appraisal of Self-Determination, 1956, 55–56, argued that «[o]n 
the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot 
decide until someone decides who are the people». 
52 Quebec Case, supra n. 47, para 123.
53 International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples, Paris, 
27–30 November 1989, SHS.89/CONF.602/7, para 22.1.
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right of peoples to internal self-determination applies «within the territorial frame-
work of independent States»54 and refers to the legal relationship between a State 
and the subject within its jurisdiction.55 
The precise content of the rights attached to internal SD remains rather vaguely 
defined under current international law. Attempts by States and scholars to define 
internal self-determination have led to rather general assertions up to this day. In the 
context of the Kosovo advisory opinion, for instance, Germany maintained that «[i]
nternal self-determination means enjoying a degree of autonomy inside a larger en-
tity, not leaving it altogether but, as a rule, deciding issues of local relevance on a local 
level».56 Scholars, in turn, have referred to «the right of people to govern, that is to 
have a democratic system of government».57 In 1995, however, Cassese observed that 
both customary and treaty law on internal self-determination have little to say with respect to the 
possible mode of implementing democratic governance. Nor do they provide guidelines on the 
possible distribution of power among institutionalized units or regions. Still less do they furnish 
workable standards concerning some possible forms of realizing internal self-determination, such 
as devolution, autonomy, or «regional» self-determination.58 
This conclusion seems to remain accurate more than 20 years later.59 
In the context of Catalonian claims, international law related to SD is thus fairly 
clear. Catalonia does not enjoy a right of external SD, i.e. a right to secession. It is not 
a colonial unity as defined under the law of the UN or an occupied territory under 
some form of alien domination, again as defined in UN law, but a mere region of a 
State, with a minority population. As an Autonomous Community, it can only claim 
internal SD (internal autonomy and protection of human rights). This is a matter 
which is regulated by the Spanish constitution, which cannot be considered to be 
oppressive of such minority rights. The ECtHR has had occasion to consider human 
rights issues in Catalonia / Spain and its case law shows the usual pattern of situation 
as anywhere else in Europe. Let’s not forget, in this regard, that the Autonomous 
Community of Catalonia has one of the most developed self-government, similar to 
54 Malcolm Shaw, «People, Territorialism and Boundaries», 8 Eur. J. Int’l L.  (1997), 478–507; Id., 
International Law, Cambridge 2017, 388, relying on the Quebec case, supra n. 47.
55 Rosalyn Higgins, «Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession», in: Catherine Brölman et al. 
(eds.), Peoples and Minorities in International Law, Dordrecht u.a. 1993, 29–26, 31.
56 Written Statement, 15  April 2010, 33.  According to Article  3.1 of the Council of Europe, European 
Charter of Local Self-Government, 15  October 1985, at <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/
full-list/-/conventions/rms/090000168007a088>, «[l]ocal self-government denotes the right and the 
ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage a substantial share of 
public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests of the local population».
57 Allen Rosas, «Internal Self-Determination», in: Christian Tomuschat (ed.), Modern Law of Self- 
Determination, Dordrecht u.a. (1992), 225, 232.
58 Antonio Cassese, Self-Determination of Peoples. A Legal Reappraisal, Cambridge 1995, 332.
59 See Patrick Macklem, «Self-Determination in Three Movements», in: Fernando Tesón (ed.), The 
Theory of Self-Determination, Cambridge 2016, 94–119, 108, 110.
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that in other territories part of many important federal states in Europe. It is also the 
most economically developed Autonomous Community of Spain and has co-official 
languages. 
C. Declaration of Independence
Claims to separate from a mother State are usually exercised through a declaration of 
independence solemnly proclaimed in the face of the world – as in the past a decla-
ration of war would be issued by the State desiring to create a state of war. The ques-
tion of whether international law prohibits an entity within a State to issue a decla-
ration of independence was central in the Kosovo advisory opinion of the ICJ in 
2010. The Court held that «the practice of States does not point to the emergence in 
international law of a new rule prohibiting the making of a declaration of independ-
ence».60 It also rejected the argument made by several States that «a prohibition of 
unilateral declarations of independence is implicit in the principle of territorial integ-
rity as it held that the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the 
sphere of relations between States».61 This conclusion is amply supported by State 
practice. It flows from the non-prohibition of secession under international law 
(below, section D). 
This is not to say that any declaration of independence is lawful under interna-
tional law. But this illegality does not stem from the unilateral character of its exer-
cise. In the Kosovo opinion, the Court thus correctly clarified that, when unilateral 
declarations of independence were treated as illegal, this was not due to their unilat-
eral character, «but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with 
the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general interna-
tional law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens)».62 This oc-
curred, for instance, with regard to the unilateral declaration of independence made 
by a racist minority in Southern Rhodesia. The Security called upon all States not to 
recognize the illegal racist minority regime in Southern Rhodesia and to refrain from 
rendering any assistance to it.63 It is not the unilateral character of the declaration or 
its objective that triggers the illegality of the declaration and the obligation not to 
recognise, but rather the violation of the right to self-determination in the colonial 
context. 
The implication of the foregoing is that the declaration of independence of Ca-
talonia does not violate any rule of international law, but does so for rules of consti-
tutional law. As recently ruled by the Council of Europe on conditions to held ref-
60 Kosovo Unilateral Declaration, advisory opinion, supra n. 32, para 79.
61 Para 80.
62 Para 81.
63 SC Resolutions 216 (1965), 12 November 1965 and 217 (1965), 20 November 1965.
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erendums in Europe, it places the constitution as the only legal framework for any 
plebiscite. This is very much related to the case of the illegal referendum organised by 
authorities of the Autonomous Community of Catalonia. International law does not 
prohibit such declarations, and neither allows them; it is indifferent to their utter-
ance. As long as the declaration remains on paper and is not followed by effective 
independence, it will have no true consequences in international law. Third States 
continue to be bound by the principles of respect for territorial integrity of Spain and 
non-intervention. The declaration will only have political effects, trying to set in 
 motion a chain of events. In the case of Catalonia, this completely failed to occur to 
this day. 
D. Secession
Secession may be a fact or a legal entitlement. In fact, it consists of violent action by 
an armed group, fighting to obtain the separation from a mother State and eventually 
obtaining that result. Third States must respect the territorial integrity and must not 
intervene in this process as long as the new State has not established effectively. On 
the other hand, secession may flow from a legal entitlement to separate from a State. 
This is the case mainly in the colonial context: the colonised peoples have a right to 
secede (as one of the options to exercise their right to self-determination), and third 
States have thus rights and obligations to sustain that search for independence. Seces-
sion can be defined as «the creation of a new independent entity through the separa-
tion of part of the territory and population of an existing State, without the consent 
of the latter».64 It is undisputed that parts of the territory of a State (i.e. a province or 
a region) may depart from the parent State with the consent of the later and provided 
that the decision reflects the genuine will of the majority of the population involved 
and is consistent with human rights. This is done by way of agreed separation. This is 
how Montenegro became a State in 2006. 
a) Whether a right to unilaterally secede – intended as a «positive entitlement»,65 
«legally enforceable entitlement»,66 or simply a «legally protected entitlement» – 
exists outside the colonial context requires an inquiry on State practice in search of a 
permissive customary rule,67 while keeping in mind that customary international 
rules are created and evolve through «a process of continuous interaction, of contin-
64 Marcelo Kohen, «Introduction», in: Marcelo Kohen (ed.), Secession. International Law Perspec-
tives, Cambridge 2009, 1–20, 3. 
65 Kosovo Unilateral Declaration, advisory opinion, supra n. 32, p. 56. 
66 Report by Thomas Franck, «Question 2», in: Anne F. Bayefsky (ed.), Self-Determination in Inter-
national Law. Quebec and Lessons Learned, The Hague 2000, 75–84, para 2.1. 
67 Since there are no applicable treaty rules. It is not sufficient that international law does not prohibit seces-
sion, since from an absence of prohibition no right to do something can be derived. 
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uous demand and response». 68 What matters, in other words, is to determine 
whether some States have put forward a sufficiently articulated legal claim about the 
legality of unilateral secession and how other States have reacted to such a claim. 
State practice indicates that a legal claim on unilateral secession outside the colonial 
context has not been clearly articulated by a significant number of States and has even 
less attracted the critical mass of acceptance, or at least acquiescence, indispensable to 
create a customary rule. Quite the contrary, States have consistently and massively 
opposed the invocation of self-determination outside the colonial context (or the 
quasi-colonial context of racist regimes and foreign occupation) as legal basis to alter 
territorial integrity – with the only and still rather controversial issue of remedial 
secession.69 The statement made by the Canadian Supreme Court in the Quebec case, 
according to which «[i]t is clear that international law does not specifically grant 
component parts of sovereign states the legal right to secede unilaterally from their 
‹parent› state»,70 reflects existing law. Likewise, the Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia held that «[o]utside the colonial 
context, self-determination is basically limited to internal self-determination. A right 
to external self-determination in [the] form of a secession is not accepted in state 
practice».71
b) What remains then is secession as a matter of fact. International law does nei-
ther prohibit it nor authorize it. As we have already seen, internal actors are not 
bound under general international law (but can be bound by particular international 
law such as a Security Council resolution) by the principle of territorial integrity and 
cannot by definition intervene in internal affairs (since they are themselves an inter-
nal actor). The international community of States has consequently accepted as fait 
accompli the unilateral secession of a not insignificant number of States. Secession 
occurred in the context of internal conflicts and possibly in the context of State dis-
solution or dismemberment  – as in the case of former Yugoslavia  – or following 
 external military intervention – as in the case of Bangladesh. No right to secede was 
68 Myres S. McDougal, «The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea», 49 Ameri-
can J. Int’l L. (1955), 353–361, 354.
69 Amongst the authors supporting a right to remedial secession, see Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legiti-
macy and Self-Determaination, Oxford 2004, Chapter 8; Christian Tomuschat, «Secession and 
Self-Determination», in: Kohen (ed.), supra n. 64; Cedric Ryngaert & Christine Griffioen, 
«The Relevance of the Right to Self-Determination in the Kosovo Matter: In Partial Response to Agora 
Papers», 8 Chinese J. Int’l L. (2009), 573–587, 581; Peter Hilpold, «Secession in International Law. 
Does the Kosovo Opinion Require a Reassessment of the Concept?», in: Peter Hilpold (ed.), Kosovo and 
International Law. The ICJ Advisory Opinion of 22  July 2010, Leiden/Boston 2012, 47–78.  Contra, 
Katherina Del Mar, «The Myth of Remedial Secession», in: Duncan French (ed.), Statehood and 
Recognition, Cambridge 2013, 79–108; Simone F. Van Den Driest, Remedial Secession. A Right to 
External Self-Determination as Remedy to Serious Injustices?, Cambridge 2013, Chapter 6.
70 Quebec Case, supra n. 47, para 111.
71 Report, vol. II (September 2009) 141.
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implied or recognized in these cases. The issue was only the recognition of a state of 
affairs, of an effectiveness. 
There is another important practical reason why States have adamantly opposed 
the right to secede. It is extremely difficult to identify the holder of the right to seces-
sion and there is thus a risk of opening a Pandora box. Practical problems are mani-
fold in this context. For example, why should the territorial entity breaking away, 
possibly on the basis of some historical claims, be allowed to secede from the parent 
State, but not a minority within that entity which would prefer to remain within the 
jurisdiction of the parent State or wishes to establish its own independent entity? 
Why should Croatia make a claim against former Yugoslavia and not the Krajina 
region against Croatia itself?72 Within the context of the claim of independence of 
Quebec, the aboriginal people Crees challenged the right of Quebec to secede not 
only because there is no such right under international law, but also because the inde-
pendence of Quebec would violate the self-determination of the Crees.73
Once more, it would be inexact to state that the process of secession, as a matter 
of fact, is not regulated by international law. It is one thing to say that the law neither 
prohibits nor allows secession, and it is another to say that the process leading to se-
cession cannot give rise to international illegalities. Various legal consequences may 
be attached to violations of international law committed during the process leading 
to secession. As held by British Government in relation to the Kosovo advisory opin-
ion, «there can be cases where separation or secession from a State raises issues of 
 illegality under international law; indeed such cases can involve issues of fundamen-
tal concern. They may involve external aggression or intervention, or widespread vio-
lation of basic human rights».74 But the illegality does not relate to the claim of se-
cession itself, but rather to the conduct the outcome of which is secession. Thus, 
secession may be upheld by a use of force of a third State; it is then this use of force 
which makes the process illegal and prompts a duty of non-recognition. 
c) In our context, it is manifest that Catalonia has no right to secede from Spain. 
We are indeed not situated in the colonial or occupational context as defined by UN 
law. As long as Catalonia is incapable of creating an effectively independent entity, no 
secession can take place. Thus, the principles of territorial integrity and non-interven-
tion continue to apply for third States, which are e.g. not entitled to recognise Cata-
lonia as an independent State. For Catalonia itself, for the time being, its subjection 
to the Spanish constitution has not ceased and therefore the secessionists can be 
called to answer for their deeds in front of Spanish courts. 
72 Thomas M. Franck, «Fairness in the International Legal and Institutional System», 240 Recueil des 
Cours (1993), 9, 136.
73 Factum of the Grand Council of the Crees (Eeyou Istchee), in: Bayefsky (ed.), supra n. 66, 351.
74 Written Statement, 17 April 2009, para 5.34.
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d) There remains the vexed issue of so-called remedial secession. The main point 
revolves around the idea that when a certain threshold of oppression and human 
rights violations (atrocity crimes) is reached, a minority can no longer be expected to 
live together with the oppressing majority and obtains a right of (remedial) secession. 
The argument relies on the so-called «safeguard clause» which has been inserted in 
Resolution 262575 as well as in the 1993 Vienna Declaration76. The clause has been 
interpreted a contrario as admitting unilateral secession – and therefore the altera-
tion of international borders – when the parent State does not comply with the prin-
ciple of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.77 This reading of the resolu-
tion was shared in the context of the Kosovo advisory opinion by several States, 
including Switzerland,78 the Netherlands79 as well as Judge Yusuf.80 The literal argu-
ment based on the «safeguard clause» is far from convincing. As clearly pointed out 
by Arangio-Ruiz, the clause 
is meant to protect the political unity and the territorial integrity of all the parties duty-bound 
under this principle, namely all States, whether possessed of colonies or similar overseas territories 
or not; whether multi-national or multi-racial; whether monolithically compact in the ethnic 
composition of their peoples or ruling also over minority groups of different origin, culture, or 
creed.81 
This interpretation has unambiguously been shared by several States in the Kosovo 
proceedings.82 It would be strange if a radical consequence, such as the one flowing 
from the recognition of a right of secession, was conceded tacitly by some a contrario 
acrobatics linked to an ambiguous text. This conclusion would all the more be ques-
75 Principle 5, para. 7. The clause reads: «Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as author-
izing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integ-
rity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a 
government representing the whole people belonging to the territory without distinction as to race, creed 
or colour».
76 World Conference on Human Rights, Declaration and Programme of Action, 12  July 1993, A/
CONF.157/23, Point I.2.
77 Lee C. Buchheit, The Legitimacy of Self Determination, New Haven/London 1978, 93.
78 Written Statement, 25 May 2009, para 61. It was argued that «the right of peoples to self-determination 
cannot be interpreted as authorising secession if the state concerned conducts itself in accordance with 
the principles of equality before the law and right of peoples to self-determination, and if the government 
represents the whole population within its territory, regardless of their race, religious beliefs or colour».
79 Written Statement, 17 April 2009, para 3.7.
80 Separate Opinion, para 12.
81 Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz, The UN Declaration on Friendly Relations and the System of the Sources 
of International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn 1979, para 80.  According to Claus Kress, «Major 
Post-Westphalian Shifts and Some Important Neo Westphalian Hesitations in the State Practice on the 
International Law on the Use of Force», 1 J. on the Use of Force and Int’l L. (2014), 11–54, 17, «states 
were extremely reluctant to activate the UN General Assembly 1970 Friendly Relations Declaration’s 
potential for a right of non-colonialised peoples to ’???????remedial secession». 
82 See, for instance, Argentina, Written Statement, 17 April 2009, para 97.
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tionable when considering that the Resolution 2625 was adopted by a community of 
States which was primarily attached to the protection of territorial integrity.
Since there is no conventional basis for such a right, State practice and opinio juris 
must be assessed with a view of determining, from the standpoint of customary in-
ternational law, the existence of a generally accepted legal claim to remedial secession. 
State practice is not dense and generally offers only marginal references to the right 
to secede and no legal claim seems to have been clearly articulated.83 It is impossible 
to infer the existence of a customary rule providing an entitlement to secession in 
such cases (what remains is the fallback position that secession can be exercised as a 
fact). The Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Geor-
gia rightly held that 
a limited, conditional extraordinary allowance to secede as a last resort in extreme cases is debated 
in international legal scholarship. However, most authors opine that such a remedial ‹right› or 
allowance does not form part of international law as it stands. The case of Kosovo has not changed 
the rules.84 
If admitted, the right to remedial secession will pose considerable challenges. What 
is the meaning of «people» in this context? Who can legitimately claim to represent 
such «people»? How to define and apply the criteria indispensable to set the thresh-
old of violation of fundamental rights – in terms of gravity, extension and duration? 
How to determine in which forms other States and International Organizations may 
assist the effective exercise of such entitlement? Can it be countenanced that claims 
to remedial secession are made years after the purported oppressive events (as oc-
curred with Kosovo in 2008, with respect with the oppression in the 1990ties)? Is it 
proportional to plead for an eternal separation of territory in case of temporary op-
pression under some autocratic government? What if there are counter-minorities 
which now feel oppressed by a new majority having remedially seceded? Must a new 
remedial secession be granted? The law risks here to become gravely entangled into 
political struggles and swamps. 
What is sure is it that if a right to remedial secession exists, it can only be exercised 
in extreme circumstances, as systematically and unambiguously indicated by the 
States supporting it. While taking a quite sympathetic stand, the Supreme Court of 
Canada emphasized that «[a] right to external self-determination (which in this case 
potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises in 
only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstanc-
es».85 Even the most cursory analysis of the enjoyment of human rights, rule of law 
and democratic governance in Catalonia would demonstrate that the situation is not 
83 For a full analysis of these cases, see John Dugard, «The Secession of States and their Recognition in 
the Wake of Kosovo», 357 Recueil des Cours (2013), Chapter IV. See also Antonello Tancredi, La 
secessione nel diritto internazionale, Padova 2001. 
84 Report, vol. II (September 2009) 141.
85 Quebec Case, supra n. 47, para 126.
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even remotely comparable with what is required to invoke remedial secession. To 
start with, the record of Spain with regard to compliance with the European Conven-
tion on Human Rights denotes a rate of condemnations which is absolutely incom-
patible with the situation of massive and egregious violations of human rights that 
could trigger a plea of remedial secession. The argument is even more compelling 
considering the absence of any intra-State complaint filed against Spain. Further, 
 violations on the scale required to justify remedial secession would certainly have led 
to the activation of the mechanism foreseen in Article 7 of the Treaty of the Euro-
pean Union.86 Thus, on any standard, the level of oppression required to allow a pur-
ported remedial secession would not be reached. If one argued for the contrary, there 
would be only very few States indeed, where the remedy of secession would not be 
available as a right of a minority. This is an absurd conclusion as to international law 
as it stands today. 
E. Recognition 
Catalonia has reached out to obtain recognition as an independent State. Can it be 
recognised by such States in the present state of affairs or would that amount to a 
violation of international law? Recognition is a legal act through which a State, in 
face of certain facts of international life, declares that it will take these facts as basis 
for its legal relations. The facts are thus regularised, they are considered lawful and 
the basis from which legal relations will arise.87 The recognition of such facts (in par-
ticular of a new State) is bound at its minimum to rules of international law and is 
otherwise a matter of discretion. To recognise a new State, such a new State must 
exist as a matter of effectiveness, i.e. there must be a territory, a population and an 
effective government able to exercise sovereignty.88 As long as this is not the case, 
recognition by third States is unlawful because it wrongfully intervenes in the inter-
nal affairs of the State. There is thus a settled rule of international law prohibiting 
«premature recognition» when the new entity has not yet established a sufficiently 
stable and effective government of its own, and is thus not yet really independent.89 
The issue arises mainly in the context of secession. In contrast, from the moment 
86 Article 7 reads: «1. On a reasoned proposal by one third of the Member States, by the European Parlia-
ment or by the European Commission, the Council, acting by a majority of four fifths of its members after 
obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, may determine that there is a clear risk of a serious 
breach by a Member State of the values referred to in Article 2. Before making such a determination, the 
Council shall hear the Member State in question and may address recommendations to it, acting in ac-
cordance with the same procedure».
87 Cf. Jean Salmon (ed.), Dictionnaire de droit international public, Brussels 2001, 938. 
88 See James Crawford, The Creation of States under International Law, 2nd ed., Oxford 2006, 37 ff. 
89 See Robert Jennings & Arthur Watts (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, 9th ed., Harlow 1992, 
143 ff.; Joe Verhoeven, La reconnaissance dans la pratique contemporaire, Paris 1975, 566 ff. 
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there is an effective new State entity, recognition becomes possible under general in-
ternational law but is not mandatory (it is rather discretionary). The very fact that 
States have sometimes imposed conditions on the granting of recognition confirms 
that they did not feel obliged to recognise the new entity merely because of the exist-
ence of an independent and effective government.90 However, once again recognition 
can be unlawful if it runs counter to an obligation under a source of particular inter-
national law (a treaty) or to a restrictive rule of general international law (such as the 
duty not to recognise States or territorial situations flowing from an unlawful use of 
force under international law).91 
Recognition has important legal effects. In the first place, it certifies the percep-
tion by the recognising States on the statehood of the newcomer and contributes to 
stabilise the legal situation.92 Recognition also paves the way to the establishment of 
diplomatic and treaty relations. It renders the new situation opposable to the recog-
nising State,93 especially with regard to possible territorial claims or internal lawsuits. 
In the context of such specific legal positions, recognition is «constitutive». Thus, 
when considering the question under the double lens of statehood and of the specific 
legal positions of the new entity, recognition is declaratory in certain respects and 
constitutive in other ones.94 
The attempt made by the Catalan authority to detach recognition from state-
hood, in the sense that recognition could be sought before the definitive acquisition 
of international legal personality, is unpersuasive. The EU, its member States, as well 
as virtually all other States, correctly refrained from considering the recognition of 
Catalonia as a newcomer in the international community. Most of the declaration 
declining to recognise the independence of Catalonia emphasised the imperative 
need to respect the territorial integrity of Spain. Yet, even before any consideration 
on territorial integrity, the evident absence of any independent (sovereign) and effec-
tive Catalan government instantaneously ruled out any possibility of granting Cata-
lonia international recognition. This is not even a question of premature recognition. 
The question is that there was no entity at all to recognise. A hypothetical recognition 
would have been deprived of any legal effects from the standpoint of the relationships 
90 European Community, Declaration on Yugoslavia and on the Guidelines on the Recognition of New States, 
16  December 1991, 31 ILM 1485 (1991). See also Danilo Turk, «Recognition of States: A Com-
ment», 4 Eur. J. Int’l L. (1993), 66–71. 
91 See e.g. John Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations, Cambridge 1987, 81ff.; James Craw-
ford, supra n. 88, 96 ff. 
92 In Quebec case, supra n. 47, para 155, Canadian Supreme Court observed that «the ultimate success of a 
secession would be dependent on recognition by the international community». 
93 See Jean Charpentier, La reconnaissance internationale et l’évolution du droit de gens, Paris 1956, 
217 ff. 
94 See Karl Zemanek, «The Legal Foundations of the International System», 266 Recueil des Cours 
(1997), 82–83. 
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between the recognising State and the entity recognised. It would also have amounted 
to an intervention in the domestic affairs of Spain.
IV. Conclusion 
From the standpoint of international law, the Catalonian claims to independence do 
not give rise to complicated legal problems to this day. Under international law (1) the 
territorial integrity of Spain must be respected; (2) Catalonia does not enjoy a right 
of external self-determination but, as any Autonomous Community of Spain, only 
rights under internal self-determination (human rights and minority rights non-ar-
guable in the present case); (3) Catalonia’s declaration of independence, as in any 
other democratic territory, does not violate international law, but is deprived of any 
concrete legal effects; (4) there is no right to secession for Catalonia, not even under 
the – still disputed – doctrine of remedial secession. A satisfactory solution between 
the government of Spain and the authorities of the Autonomous Community of 
 Catalonia may be achieved along the lines indicated by the Constitutional Tribunal. 
If it is agreed, then it must be acknowledged that sovereignty rests on the people of 
Spain and that the Spanish constitution must be reformed beforehand. 
